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NEURO LIE DETECTION AND MENTAL PRIVACY 
MADISON KILBRIDE* & JASON IULIANO† 
ABSTRACT 
 New technologies inevitably raise novel legal questions.  This is 
particularly true of technologies, such as neuro lie detection, that 
offer new ways to investigate crime.  Recently, a number of 
scholars have asked whether neuro lie detection testing is consti-
tutional.  So far, the debate has focused on the Fifth Amend-
ment—specifically whether evidence gathered through neuro lie 
detection is constitutionally admissible because it is “physical” 
in nature or inadmissible because it is “testimonial” in nature.  
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, this Fifth Amendment de-
bate is intractable.  However, the more fundamental question of 
whether the government can compel individuals to undergo a 
neuro lie detection test does have a clear answer.  It just so hap-
pens that the answer lies in the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth.  
In this Paper, we argue that forcing a criminal defendant, or any 
other person, to submit to a neuro lie detection test is a substan-
tial invasion of mental privacy that is unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The success of any judicial system is predicated on the ability of judg-
es and jurors to distinguish truths from lies.  Given that humans are highly 
fallible in this regard, there is immense interest in developing a scientific 
technique that reliably detects deception.  Currently, the polygraph exami-
nation is the most widely used form of scientific lie detection.  However, 
given its lack of accuracy, few U.S. jurisdictions allow polygraph evidence 
to be admitted in court.1  At present, new techniques and technologies are 
being developed to fill this void by providing a scientifically valid and ac-
curate method of lie detection.  Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(“fMRI”) is one technology that may have the potential to help the legal 
system decipher truths from lies. 
An fMRI is a neural imaging procedure that measures brain activity by 
observing changes in blood flow.  More specifically, the technology detects 
the delivery of oxygenated blood to neurons that have just fired.  In this 
way, fMRI helps researchers understand which parts of the brain respond to 
particular stimuli.  In clinical settings, it has a broad range of applications.  
For instance, fMRI has already been used to plan neurosurgical procedures, 
diagnose psychiatric disorders, and examine the effects of drugs and behav-
ioral therapy. 
Given the potential uses of fMRI in legal proceedings, several com-
mercial firms have already begun marketing this technology for its lie de-
tection capabilities.  One of the major companies in the field, No Lie MRI, 
boasts an accuracy rate over ninety percent.2  Even though some scientists 
have expressed skepticism about the validity of this claim,3 it is easy to see 
how the technology could have widespread applications in criminal and civ-
il cases. 
With these recent advances in neuro lie detection, it is not surprising 
that academics have already begun to ask whether the use of such technolo-
gies in legal proceedings would be constitutionally permissible.  Thus far, 
the debate has centered on the question of whether compelling a criminal 
defendant to submit to a neuro lie detection test is a violation of the Fifth 
                                                          
 1.  Nineteen states allow the admission of polygraph results when both parties consent.  On-
ly New Mexico permits the introduction of polygraph results under its regular evidentiary rules. 
Legal Admissibility of Polygraph Test Results, MATTE POLYGRAPH SERV., 
http://www.mattepolygraph.com/legal_admissibility.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015). 
 2.  See Product Overview, NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm 
(last visited Sept. 15,2 2015) (“Current accuracy is over 90% and is estimated to be 99% once 
product development is complete.”). 
 3.  See Alexis Madrigal, MRI Lie Detection to Get First Day in Court, WIRED (MAR. 16, 
2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/03/noliemri/ (noting that “some scientists and law-
yers . . . doubt that [fMRI lie detection] results will prove replicable outside the lab setting, and 
others say it just isn’t ready yet.”). 
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Amendment protection against self-incrimination.  Although this question is 
an interesting one, at present, it is intractable. 
The central point of contention in the Fifth Amendment debate is 
whether evidence gathered from neuro lie detection is “physical”—and, 
therefore, constitutionally admissible—or “testimonial”—and, therefore, 
inadmissible.  Scholars on both sides of the discussion have developed per-
suasive arguments to support their positions.4  Because neuro lie detection 
is qualitatively different from any traditional form of evidence, existing 
court doctrine simply does not provide sufficient guidance to settle the Fifth 
Amendment issue.  As things stand, the physical-testimonial debate is unre-
solvable. 
Nonetheless, the question of whether it is constitutionally permissible 
to compel a criminal defendant to undergo a neuro lie detection test can be 
answered.  In this Paper, we advance the conversation by shifting focus 
from the Fifth Amendment to the Fourth Amendment.  That maneuver has 
two key benefits.  First, it moves us away from the intractable physical-
testimonial dispute by recasting the problem as an issue of mental privacy 
and human dignity.  Second, it expands the scope of the debate.  To date, 
the discussion has focused solely on criminal defendants.  However, there is 
another group of individuals who would be likely subjects of government-
compelled neuro lie detection tests. That group is witnesses. 
We believe that there is something fundamentally wrong with forcing 
witnesses—who are often innocent bystanders and sometimes victims 
themselves—to submit to a procedure that invades their mental privacy to 
such a substantial degree.  Unfortunately, the current discourse says nothing 
about whether the government could force a witness to submit to a neuro lie 
detection test.  Unlike criminal defendants, witnesses are generally unable 
to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  There-
fore, any objection must be founded upon another constitutional provision.   
In this Paper, we lay out the basis for an argument that derives its sup-
port from the Fourth Amendment.  We argue that compelled neuro lie de-
tection infringes upon a witness’s right to mental privacy and, in doing so, 
undermines that person’s human dignity.  Our Fourth Amendment analysis 
also resolves the question of whether a criminal defendant can be forced to 
take a neuro lie detection test—something the Fifth Amendment debate is 
unable to do.  Because the constitution grants criminal defendants the same 
degree of dignity and respect that is accorded to all persons, the State may 
not force defendants to submit to such tests either.  By setting aside the 
Fifth Amendment issue and focusing the debate on a more fundamental 
constitutional principle, we are able to make progress on this formerly in-
tractable problem. 
                                                          
 4.  See infra Part II. 
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In Part I of this Paper, we discuss recent advances in neuro lie detec-
tion.  In Part II, we examine the current debate about whether forcing a de-
fendant to undergo a neuro lie detection test violates his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Finally, in Part III, we refocus the de-
bate by considering the issue as applied to witnesses.  Ultimately, we argue 
that the State cannot force anyone—defendant or witness—to submit to 
neuro lie detection testing.  To do so would be to violate a person’s Fourth 
Amendment right to mental privacy and the associated constitutional guar-
antee of human dignity. 
I.  RECENT ADVANCES IN NEURO LIE DETECTION 
Before fMRI became the dominant technology in deception research, 
neuroscientists used scalp-recorded event-related potentials (“ERPs”) to 
study changes in electrical activity in the brain in response to external stim-
uli.5  ERPs are measured by electroencephalography (“EEG”), which de-
tects electrical activity in the brain by attaching electrodes to the scalp.  
While ERPs are a direct measure of brain activity, “their source in the brain 
cannot be uniquely localized.”6  Thus, although an EEG can tell researchers 
whether there is more or less brain activity in response to a mental process, 
it is silent on which brain regions are active.  fMRI solves the localization 
problem by enabling neuroscientists to identify and localize the brain re-
gions involved in different mental processes, including deception.  While 
the details are complicated, the basic idea is straightforward.  fMRI is able 
to measure brain activity by detecting changes in cerebral blood flow.7  Be-
cause cerebral blood flow and neuronal activation are coupled, when a re-
gion of the brain is in use, blood flow to that region increases. 
A.  Experiments 
In the first peer-reviewed and published report on the use of fMRI to 
study deception, experimenters used a modified version of what is known 
as the Guilty Knowledge Test (“GKT”).8  This test can be used during a 
polygraph interrogation to test the accused on elements of a crime that 
could only be known by the guilty party.  Typically, questions are presented 
in multiple-choice format (as opposed to a polygraph examination which 
                                                          
 5.  For a comprehensive explanation of event-related potentials, see STEVEN J. LUCK, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE 1–48 (2005). 
 6.  D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727 (2002). 
 7.  An in-depth discussion of the science behind fMRI is beyond the scope of this Paper.  For 
a good introduction, see SCOTT A. HUETTEL, ALLEN W. SONG & GREGORY MCCARTHY, 
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1–23 (2d ed. 2009). 
 8.  Langleben et al., supra note 6, at 729. 
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traditionally employs “yes” or “no” questions).  The basic principle behind 
the GKT is that the subject will have an elevated physiological reaction to 
the correct answer.  Such a response suggests that the subject recognizes the 
correct answer and, therefore, possesses knowledge of the crime.9 
In this early fMRI deception study, participants were asked to choose 
one of three sealed envelopes and memorize the card inside.10  Each enve-
lope contained a twenty-dollar bill and a five of clubs playing card.  The 
participants were told that they could keep the twenty dollars if they con-
cealed the identity of the card in the envelope from the “computer.”11  Par-
ticipants were then placed inside the fMRI machine whereupon they were 
shown images of various playing cards.  For each image, participants were 
instructed to press one of two buttons to indicate whether the card shown 
matched the card in the envelope. 
The researchers hypothesized that they would be able to detect and lo-
calize a difference in brain activity between lies and truths.  After averaging 
the data from eighteen participants, they found that two brain regions 
showed increased activation when subjects were lying.12 
The preceding study used group analysis, which means that the data 
from each participant’s scan were averaged together and analyzed as a 
group. Accordingly, a study using group data analysis might reveal in-
creased activation in a particular brain region even if that region was not ac-
tivated in every subject. 
From a legal standpoint, group studies are not especially useful.  After 
all, the law is not interested in patterns of neural activity across subjects.  
Rather, judges and jurors want to know whether a particular individual is 
lying or telling the truth.  Nevertheless, group studies may provide some-
thing like a blueprint of the pattern of neural activity associated with decep-
tion.  If so, a neuroscientist could scan an individual subject and then com-
pare his pattern of brain activity against the averaged results from a group 
of subjects.  If the individual’s results were sufficiently similar to that of the 
group, one could reasonably infer whether he was lying or telling the truth. 
One study that used the group analysis method also employed a modi-
fied version of the GKT. Investigators began by collecting group data.  
They then developed a model that could analyze individual data and indi-
cate whether a single person was being truthful or deceitful based on the 
                                                          
 9.  See David T. Lykken, Why (Some) Americans Believe in the Lie Detector While Others 
Believe in the Guilty Knowledge Test, 26 INTEGR. PHYSIOL. BEHAV. SCI. 214 (1991). 
 10.  Langleben et al., supra note 6, at 729. 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. at 730. 
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patterns of activation present in the group data.  Researchers found that the 
model was able to classify seventy-eight percent of responses accurately.13 
B.  Shortcomings of Current Research 
One of the biggest challenges facing fMRI deception research is the 
need for experimental designs that are ecologically valid (i.e., study designs 
that approximate real-world scenarios).  Several researchers have attempted 
to improve upon the ecological validity of previous work by having partici-
pants engage in mock crimes.  For example, in one experiment, “subjects 
were taken to a specific room and instructed to ‘steal’ either a watch or a 
ring located in a drawer . . . and place the ‘stolen’ object in a locker along 
with their other belongings.”14  Participants were then scanned while re-
sponding to visually presented questions.  The participants were instructed 
to deny taking either object but to answer neutral and control questions as 
honestly and accurately as possible.  To motivate participants to do their 
best, the researchers informed them that they would receive an additional 
fifty dollars if the fMRI investigator could not decipher when they were ly-
ing. 
An initial group of subjects was scanned and their data was used to 
develop analysis methods for determining when a response was a lie.  These 
methods were then applied to a second group of participants to identify 
when they were lying.  The investigators were quite successful in differenti-
ating truthful responses from lies.  In ninety percent of the cases, the re-
searchers correctly identified the stolen object.15 
Further attesting to the ecological validity of this experiment is the fact 
that, in a post-experiment survey, eighty percent of the participants stated 
“that they believed that they were participating in a crime.”16  Additionally, 
many of the participants performed countermeasures in an effort to trick the 
fMRI.  Such actions included “pretending they did not take the object, im-
agining a specific place, altering breathing, or delaying response.”17  Nota-
bly, none of these countermeasures reduced the ability of the investigators 
to correctly determine the stolen object.18  These results suggest that fMRI 
                                                          
 13.  Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-
Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 267 (2005). 
 14.  F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance, 58 
BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 605, 606 (2005). 
 15.  Id. at 610.  Given this study’s high accuracy rate, it is worth noting that it was largely 
funded by Cephos, one of the leading companies in developing a commercially available fMRI 
test for lie detection.  Id. at 612. 
 16.  Id. at 611. 
 17.  Id. at 611–12. 
 18.  Id. 
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lie detection could be successful against even those criminal defendants 
who have strong incentives to fool the machine. 
There have been several other attempts to develop ecologically valid 
deception scenarios.  In one recent study, the researchers adapted the stand-
ard GKT to the “real life” scenario of lying on a resume.19  The experiment 
involved a single subject, JG, who was asked questions about items on his 
resume.20  Three of the questions could be independently verified 
(KNOWN), and three could not be verified (UNKNOWN).  The experiment 
was structured such that JG had an incentive to lie on all UNKNOWN 
items, and a post-study debriefing confirmed that he had, in fact, lied when 
answering questions about those items. 
The research team had originally hypothesized that the pattern of brain 
activation during the lie responses would be similar to that observed in oth-
er studies.  This hypothesis turned out to be correct for some of the ques-
tions.  Specifically, JG’s responses to two of the UNKNOWN questions 
could be categorized as lies because they revealed patterns of brain activa-
tion normally associated with deception.21  However, for the third 
UNKNOWN question, the experimenters were not able to classify the sub-
ject’s answer as a lie because it did not follow the typical prefronto-parietal 
pattern.22  These results are particularly interesting because the pattern of 
brain activity associated with the subject’s third answer involved regions of 
the brain that had not previously been implicated in deception.23 
Although almost every preceding fMRI deception study has reported 
fronto-parietal activation, this study indicates that brain activation of that 
kind is not a necessary consequence of deception.  Although this is only one 
finding in one study, it should encourage us to remain cautious when mak-
ing any claims about the neural correlates of deception.  It is very clear 
from existing studies that not all individuals have the same pattern of neural 
activity when engaging in deception. 
Clearly, one of the biggest challenges facing fMRI deception research-
ers is creating experimental designs that are ecologically valid.  Even 
though several studies have used experimental designs that better approxi-
mate real-life situations, fundamentally, all of these studies involve highly 
contrived scenarios. 
Unfortunately, designing a truly ecologically valid study is virtually 
impossible.  Because all studies involving human subjects must comport 
                                                          
 19.  J.G. Hakun et al., Towards Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI, 4 SOC. 
NEUROSCIENCE 518, 519 (2009). 
 20.  Id. at 520–21. 
 21.  Id. at 522. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 522–24. 
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with strict ethical standards, there are clear limitations on the extent to 
which experimenters can manipulate participants.  In each of the fMRI stud-
ies discussed above, all of the participants were aware that their deceptive 
acts were sanctioned and were taking place within an experimental setting.  
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to design an experiment that 
would address these concerns and still receive approval by a university’s 
institutional review board. 
As Nancy Kanwisher cautions, it is possible that these studies are not 
actually investigating the neural correlates of lying.24  She points out that 
giving a false response when one has been instructed to do so is not really a 
lie per se.  Rather, it is an “instructed falsehood.”25  Therefore, existing 
studies can only tell us about the brain activation that occurs during an “in-
structed falsehood.”  This is potentially a major problem.  As Kanwisher 
observes, it is entirely possible, if not likely, that the pattern of neural activ-
ity of an individual who is genuinely lying will be significantly different 
than that of an individual who has been instructed to lie.26 
Another concern about the use of fMRI in the legal setting is scanning-
induced stress.  In experimental studies, fMRI operators aim to minimize 
scanning-induced stress.27  In fact, in the previously mentioned Langleben 
study—the first peer-reviewed GKT study—the research team explicitly 
states that none of the participants reported symptoms of anxiety before or 
after the scanning session.28  For obvious reasons, this is unlikely to be the 
case in a criminal trial where the defendant has been accused of a real crime 
and is facing real punishment. 
A defendant who has submitted to fMRI scanning in the hopes of ex-
oneration is likely to be extremely anxious.  As Kanwisher explains, the in-
dividual will be anxious—regardless of whether he is guilty—simply be-
cause he is a suspect and faces the possibility of severe punishment.29  
Although experimental participants may have had a financial incentive to 
lie, a twenty- or fifty-dollar reward represents a very low stakes situation 
compared to a trial where the defendant’s life may hang in the balance. 
Since none of the subjects in any of these studies faced any threat of 
sanction if their lies were detected, anxiety likely did not affect their neural 
activity.  Therefore, these studies cannot speak to how anxiety may affect 
                                                          
 24.  Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of fMRI in Lie Detection: What Has Been Shown and What 
Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 7, 12–
13 (2009). 
 25.  Id. at 12. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  This minimization of harm is another requirement imposed by institutional review 
boards. 
 28.  Langleben et al., supra note 6, at 730. 
 29.  Kanwisher, supra note 24, at 12. 
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one’s pattern of brain activity.  Given the significant differences between 
experimental scenarios and a criminal trial, we cannot expect that the neural 
activation pattern of a criminal defendant, who is lying to avoid imprison-
ment—or possibly capital punishment—will bear a strong resemblance to 
the neural activation patterns of research subjects who have been instructed 
to lie. 
 Another shortcoming of existing research is that all individual-subject 
studies still indirectly utilize group data.  For instance, in the Kozel study 
discussed above, the researchers began by scanning one group of partici-
pants and using their results to identify clusters of significant brain activity 
that could then be used to classify the responses of individual subjects as 
either truths or lies.  Even when experimenters do not conduct their own 
group scans, they still rely upon the work of prior group studies.  This was 
the case in the resume-deception study, for example.30 
Even though these single-subject studies boast high degrees of accura-
cy, their methodologies are not sufficiently advanced for use in the legal 
setting.  This is true for two reasons.  First, the number of subjects in both 
studies is relatively small (n=26 in the 2005 Langleben study and n=31 in 
the Kozel study).  From a research perspective, the sample size in these 
studies is large enough to provide insight into which brain regions tend to 
be active during deception and to use those findings to predict whether an-
other experimental subject is being truthful.  However, from a legal per-
spective, it would be unethical to conclude that a particular defendant is ly-
ing simply because his pattern of neural activity is similar to that of a few 
dozen experimental subjects. 
Second, the participants in each of these studies tend to be extremely 
homogenous.  In the 2005 Langleben study, all of the participants were 
right-handed, healthy, male undergraduate students.31  The Kozel study was 
a bit more diverse, but not by much.  That sample group consisted of 
healthy, unmedicated adults between the ages of eighteen and fifty.32  In 
addition, all of the participants were screened prior to scanning for psychiat-
ric illness and deemed neurologically normal.33  Given that more than half 
of all inmates have a mental illness,34 this is an especially worrisome gap. 
Taken together, existing research suggests that important progress is 
being made with respect to understanding the patterns of brain activation 
                                                          
 30.  Kozel et al., supra note 14, at 608. 
 31.  Langleben et al., supra note 13, at 263. 
 32.  Kozel et al., supra note 14, at 606. 
 33.   It is likely that an individual with a psychiatric disorder such as psychopathy or schizo-
phrenia would produce a very different pattern of neural activity when engaging in deception.   
 34.  DORIS L. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL 
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
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associated with deception, as well as predicting when an individual subject 
is lying.  However, given the many weaknesses of this experimental work, 
it is clear that fMRI lie detection is not yet ready for use in the courtroom. 
Despite these problems, we should not ignore the legal implications of 
neuro lie detection.  The rapid progress made in recent years indicates that 
the legal admissibility of this technology will likely be a live issue in the 
near future.  Indeed, neuro lie detection is already being used in other crim-
inal justice systems.  For instance, the Indian government has used the 
technology to investigate more than 150 suspects.35  Most notably, in a 
2008 case in Mumbai, a judge relied almost exclusively on neuro lie detec-
tion results when he sentenced a woman to life in prison for murdering her 
former fiancé.36  The fact that neuro lie detection has already been used to 
convict people of murder indicates that we should take the constitutional 
issues surrounding this technology seriously. 
II.  THE CURRENT DEBATE: SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o per-
son . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.”37  The Supreme Court has held that, in order for evidence to fall with-
in the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, it must be (1) incriminating, 
(2) testimonial, and (3) compelled.38  Two of these conditions (incrimina-
tion and compulsion) are quite easy to identify.  In fact, with respect to the 
current debate, all scholars agree that forcing a criminal defendant to submit 
to neuro lie detection qualifies as a form of compulsion, the purpose of 
which is to uncover incriminating evidence.  Accordingly, nearly all of the 
work on this topic has focused on the testimonial criterion.  Although the 
question of whether neuro evidence is physical or testimonial has provoked 
an interesting debate, we believe the discussion has reached an impasse.  
Given the Court’s existing jurisprudence, there is no way to determine 
whether the results of neuro lie detection constitute testimonial evidence 
and would, therefore, be privileged under the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
                                                          
 35.  Angela Saini, The Brain Police: Judging Murder with an MRI, WIRED, (May 27, 2009) 
http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2009/06/features/guilty. 
 36.  Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/asia/15brainscan.html?pagewanted=all. 
 37.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 38.  See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not 
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but ap-
plies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminat-
ing.”). 
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The Court first established the physical-testimonial distinction in the 
landmark decision of Schmerber v. California.39  In Schmerber, the defend-
ant, Armando Schmerber, was hospitalized after crashing his car.  A police 
officer smelled alcohol on Schmerber’s breath and observed other symp-
toms of drunkenness.  At the hospital, the officer placed Schmerber under 
arrest and, despite the defendant’s refusal to consent, directed a physician to 
take a blood sample.  Chemical analysis of the blood indicated intoxication.  
Over Schmerber’s objections, a report of the blood work was admitted into 
evidence at trial. 
The Supreme Court held that the forcible taking of a blood sample 
from the accused did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination because it was not testimonial in nature: 
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced 
communication by the accused was involved either in the extrac-
tion or in the chemical analysis.  Petitioner’s testimonial capaci-
ties were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except 
as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend 
on chemical analysis and on that alone.  Since the blood test evi-
dence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was nei-
ther petitioner’s testimony nor evidence relating to some commu-
nicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible 
on privilege grounds.40 
The Court emphasized that the Fifth Amendment protects the accused 
from having to “provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature”41 but permits the State to gather physical evidence from 
the accused.42  With this passage, the Court codified the physical-
testimonial dichotomy that is still in use today.  Despite articulating this dis-
tinction, the Court failed to adequately define either “physical” or “testimo-
nial.”43 
In fact, in the five decades since Schmerber was decided, the Court has 
never laid out a clear test for determining whether evidence is physical or 
testimonial.  Instead, the Justices have opted to proceed in a case-by-case 
manner—making narrow determinations that solve the case at hand but that 
                                                          
 39.  384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 40.  Id. at 765 (footnote omitted).  
 41.  Id. at 761.  
 42.  Id.  “The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the 
privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which 
makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.”  Id. at 
764. 
 43.  Id. at 764 (discussing the physical-testimonial divide, the Court observed that “both fed-
eral and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to 
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in 
court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture”). 
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provide only minimal guidance for future issues.44  This incremental ap-
proach has left gaps in the case law that have led scholars to debate the pre-
cise meaning of the terms. 
In many circumstances, it is not clear whether evidence is “testimoni-
al” or “physical.”  Neuro lie detection evidence is particularly ambiguous 
and may be the most difficult case yet.  The nature of the technology pre-
sents novel challenges to the physical-testimonial divide, straddling the line 
in a way that no other type of evidence ever has.  Is a device that detects 
blood flow within a person’s brain extracting physical or testimonial evi-
dence from the individual?  Is tracking blood flow patterns in a person’s 
brain meaningfully different than extracting blood from his arm?  Is it rele-
vant that the blood flow patterns reveal information that could previously be 
acquired only by interrogating the accused?  Scholars have examined these 
sorts of questions at length in an effort to draw analogies between neuro lie 
detection and more traditional forms of evidence.45 
Unfortunately, this debate has played out to a draw.  Both sides—those 
who believe neuro lie detection evidence is physical and those who believe 
it is testimonial—have advanced compelling arguments that are equally 
supported by existing doctrine.  At this point, there is a gap in the case law 
that only the courts can patch.  To see why, consider polygraph tests—the 
closest analogue to neuro lie detection. 
A standard polygraph test measures and records physiological indica-
tors of stress, including blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and skin conduc-
tivity, while an individual responds to a series of questions.  The basic prin-
ciple of polygraph testing is that deceptive answers will yield heightened 
physiological responses compared to non-deceptive answers.  These physio-
logical responses can then be used to determine whether a defendant is tell-
ing the truth or knows facts about a crime that he is unwilling to reveal. 
One might be inclined to think that a person’s physiological responses 
are just as physical as his blood.  After all, when a suspect’s blood is ex-
tracted it is analyzed and used to infer his guilt or innocence, in much the 
same way that his physiological responses could be used to make judgments 
about his involvement in a crime.   
Although the Court has never ruled on whether compelling a criminal 
defendant to submit to a polygraph test would violate the Fifth Amendment, 
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it has addressed the matter in dicta.  Most notably, in Schmerber, the Court 
recognized that the results of polygraph testing straddle the physical-
testimonial divide: 
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for 
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function 
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting re-
sponses which are essentially testimonial.  To compel a person to 
submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his 
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, wheth-
er willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth 
Amendment.46 
In this passage, the Court indicates that, even though physiological respons-
es are physical in nature, the results of polygraph testing qualify as testimo-
nial because they are designed to “elicit[] responses which are essentially 
testimonial.” 
At first glance, the Court seems to have solved the neuro lie detection 
question.  After all, like polygraph tests, neuro lie detection uses physiolog-
ical changes to determine an individual’s guilt or innocence.  However, the 
analogy breaks down when one considers that the Supreme Court has held 
that testimonial evidence requires a communicative act on the part of the 
person seeking to assert the privilege.  As the Court wrote in Schmerber: 
[T]he Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the per-
son to whom the privilege applies, and we use [the] words [testi-
monial and communicative] subject to the same limitations.  A 
nod or head-shake is as much a “testimonial” or “communicative” 
act in this sense as are spoken words.  But the terms as we use 
them do not apply to evidence of acts noncommunicative in na-
ture as to the person asserting the privilege . . . .47 
This footnote shows that the Court is not concerned with whether evi-
dence itself communicates information to the jury.  Indeed, if all evidence 
that communicated information to jurors were barred, then no evidence 
would ever be admissible.  Rather, only communicative “acts on the part of 
the person to whom the privilege applies” fall within the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  In other words, an individual cannot invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination when a noncommunicative act produces 
evidence that in turn communicates facts to the jury.  For example, submit-
ting to a blood test constitutes a noncommunicative act because 
“[p]etitioner’s testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his 
participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, 
                                                          
 46.  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
 47.  Id. at 761 n.5 (emphasis added). 
 176 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:163 
which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone.”48  By contrast, nod-
ding one’s head or making a verbal statement constitutes a communicative 
act that requires participation. 
So, how does this passage from Schmerber inform the Court’s earlier 
statement regarding polygraph examinations?  Well, it tells us that the re-
sults of polygraph exams are privileged because they can only be obtained 
through a communicative act by the defendant.  Indeed, looked at in this 
light, it immediately becomes clear why polygraph tests must be privileged.  
A compelled polygraph test automatically violates a suspect’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege because it requires the suspect to provide verbal re-
sponses, which are then analyzed alongside his physiological responses to 
draw inferences about the truthfulness of his statements.  The defendant’s 
verbal responses are communicative acts even though non-voluntary physi-
ological evidence is being used to verify the truthfulness of the statements. 
Neuro lie detection operates differently than a standard polygraph.  
Although some forms of neuro lie detection utilize the defendant’s respons-
es, many others do not.  Therefore, if the Court adheres to the reasoning in 
Schmerber, it will be forced to conclude that certain forms of neuro lie de-
tection are constitutional whereas others are not.  To see where the dividing 
line falls, consider functional magnetic resonance imaging.  Each of the 
fMRI studies discussed earlier required the subject to perform a communi-
cative act (normally pressing a button).  Under Schmerber, these uses of 
fMRI would be testimonial and, therefore, protected.  Other neuro lie detec-
tion techniques, however, do not require any communicative act on the part 
of the defendant. There are even some neuro lie detection designs, such as 
Brain Fingerprinting, where the subject never becomes consciously aware 
of the stimulus and, therefore, cannot possibly engage in a communicative 
act. 
Brain Fingerprinting seeks to determine whether information about a 
particular event is stored in an individual’s brain.49  This technique involves 
attaching electrodes to an individual’s head to record brain activity.  The 
person is then shown a series of words or images on a computer screen.  
Each visual stimulus appears for only a fraction of a second.  Some of the 
stimuli concern details of the crime that only the perpetrator (and those in-
volved in the investigation) could know.  The images or words that are rel-
evant to the particular crime are called “probes.”  The electrodes detect 
brainwaves known as “event-related potentials” or ERPs, which measure 
the electrical activity of many neurons in response to a particular stimulus. 
When a word or image holds special significance to an individual, neu-
ral activity generates a blip in the ERP signal called the “P300” because it 
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 49.  See Jonathan Knight, The Truth About Lying, 428 NATURE 692, 692 (2004). 
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occurs approximately 300 milliseconds after exposure to a stimulus.  For 
example, if the suspect stabbed his victim to death, an image of a knife 
would elicit a P300, whereas an image of a baseball bat would not.  Thus, a 
suspect’s neurological response to the probes may indicate that his brain 
recognizes stimuli associated with the crime, even if he explicitly disavows 
having knowledge of what happened.  Insofar as Brain Fingerprinting can 
be accomplished without requiring any form of communicative act on the 
part of the suspect, it would be constitutionally permissible under 
Schmerber. 
Although supported by Court doctrine, the conclusion that some forms 
of neuro lie detection are permissible when others are not is nonsensical.  It 
is this realization that has led some scholars to categorize all forms of neuro 
evidence as either completely physical or completely testimonial.  Henry 
Greely and Anthony Wagner—scholars who fall in the physical camp—go 
so far as to say that, “[a]n fMRI scan is nothing more than a computer rec-
ord of radio waves emitted by molecules in the brain.  It does not seem like 
‘testimony.’”50  
If one follows this analysis to its natural conclusion, then one must ac-
cept that even when the defendant is compelled to produce a response, the 
results of the neuro lie detection test would not be testimonial because the 
suspect’s response is not being used for its testimonial content.  Although 
the suspect does engage in a communicative act when he answers “yes” or 
“no” or presses a button in response to the examiner’s questions, the evi-
dence that is used to determine guilt or innocence—namely the computer-
ized blood flow patterns—is spontaneous and unrelated to any sort of com-
municative act. 
By this analysis, any evidence acquired through neuro lie detection 
would be permissible because it is nothing more than a digital record of 
brain activity.51  Although there are reasonable arguments for the view that 
neuro lie detection evidence is physical, these interpretations are unneces-
sarily reductive and miss the inherent testimonial nature of the evidence.  
On a technical level, it is true that investigators are only analyzing changes 
in blood flow patterns.  However, unlike blood or DNA analysis, neuro lie 
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detection is aimed at analyzing a suspect’s mental content.  Surely infor-
mation that has been forcibly extracted from a person’s mind is “directed to 
eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial.”52  Furthermore, treat-
ing all neuro evidence as physical is untenable because it would strip too 
much protection from the Fifth Amendment.  Indeed, categorizing neuro 
evidence in this manner would essentially obliterate the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.  After all, where is the benefit in the right to refuse to take the stand 
if the government can simply force you to answer all of its questions via a 
neuro lie detection test? 
So far, we have presented two solutions to the physical-testimonial co-
nundrum. The first is a hybrid option that treats some forms of neuro evi-
dence as physical and other forms as testimonial. The second treats all 
forms of neuro evidence as physical.  Both solutions present reasonable ar-
guments; however, they both lead to untenable conclusions. If neither the 
hybrid option nor the solely physical option is supportable, then only one 
possibility remains: all forms of neuro lie detection evidence are testimonial 
and, therefore, protected under the Fifth Amendment.  In the remainder of 
this Section, we examine this possibility and ultimately conclude that this 
solution, too, suffers from serious defects. 
Michael Pardo has developed the most comprehensive argument that 
evidence acquired through neuro lie detection is testimonial.53  He main-
tains that testimony is “any evidence that requires reliance by the fact-finder 
on the epistemic authority of the defendant.”54  As Pardo explains, in 
providing testimony, “speakers typically assert some proposition while (1) 
intending the assertion to make an evidentiary contribution to the audience, 
and (2) believing the assertion is relevant to a matter that is in dispute for 
the audience or for which the audience is otherwise in need [of] evi-
dence.”55  Towards the end of his article, Pardo addresses lie detectors.  He 
argues that the results of polygraphs and other lie-detection tests are funda-
mentally testimonial because they are just “inductive evidence of the de-
fendant’s epistemic state.”56  As he explains, the evidence gleaned through 
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a lie-detection test tells us either “(1) that we can or cannot rely on the as-
sertions made by the defendant and for which he has represented himself to 
be an authority, or (2) what propositions the defendant would assume au-
thority for and would invite reliance upon, were he to testify truthfully.”57  
By contrast, extracted blood cannot be used to infer the mental state of the 
accused.  Blood analysis can only provide information that is independent 
of the individual’s mental state, such as whether he was intoxicated or 
whether his DNA matches that found on the murder weapon.  This infor-
mation can in turn be used to determine whether the accused was driving 
while intoxicated or whether he committed the murder.  Blood analysis 
does not reveal anything about the suspect’s knowledge of a crime. 
In another paper, Pardo develops a theory of the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege that specifically considers evidence acquired through 
neuroscience technologies.  He argues that “the government may not com-
pel for use as evidence the content of a suspect’s propositional attitudes” 
when these include “mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, doubts, hopes, 
wishes, desires, knowledge, and so on, toward propositions.”58 
Under Pardo’s definition of testimony, neuro lie detection evidence is 
testimonial.  Even when a suspect is not required to communicate during 
the exam, the suspect’s neural activity would enable the fact-finder to de-
termine which propositions the suspect would assume authority for if he 
were to testify truthfully.  For example, if a particular image generates the 
telltale neurological blip, the fact-finder can infer that the suspect would as-
sume authority for a proposition to the effect of “I recognize that individu-
al’s face.”  In this way, the fact-finder effectively relies on the suspect’s ep-
istemic authority.  Although Pardo recognizes that testimony is usually 
accompanied by a communicative act, he does not think that such an act is 
necessary for evidence to count as testimony.  Rather, evidence is testimo-
nial whenever it provides an inductive link to an individual’s epistemic 
state. 
We believe that Pardo has mounted the best defense possible for clas-
sifying neuro evidence as testimonial.  We even believe that he endorses the 
optimal policy conclusion—the Fifth Amendment should protect against 
any form of compelled neuro lie detection.  The problem is that Pardo’s po-
sition is difficult to square with existing case law.  The Court has long em-
phasized that testimony necessarily involves an act on the part of the indi-
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vidual asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.59  In light of these emerg-
ing technologies, the Court may need to reconsider this condition. Until it 
does, Pardo’s account cannot find firm support in Supreme Court precedent. 
As we have already discussed, the connection between testimony and 
communicative action dates back to Schmerber.  One line from that opinion 
bears repeating: “the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the 
person to whom the privilege applies.”  This stipulation has played an im-
portant role in several more recent cases. 
In the 1981 decision Estelle v. Smith,60 the Court ordered an in-custody 
psychiatric examination of the defendant to determine whether he was com-
petent to stand trial.  During a capital-sentencing proceeding, the examining 
doctor testified that the defendant was “a very severe sociopath” who would 
“continue his previous behavior” and that his condition would “only get 
worse.”61  The doctor further emphasized that the defendant had “no re-
morse or sorrow” for his actions.62  The question before the Court was 
whether admission of the psychiatrist’s damaging testimony violated the de-
fendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the 
defendant was not apprised of his Miranda rights prior to the exam.  In de-
lineating the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court explained 
that an individual’s right is not violated so long as “the evidence given by a 
defendant is neither related to some communicative act nor used for the tes-
timonial content of what was said.”63 
At first, this line seems to suggest that evidence constitutes testimony 
if it meets one of two distinct conditions: (1) it is related to some “commu-
nicative act” or (2) it is used for its “testimonial content.”  If this was the 
Court’s holding, it would provide strong support for Pardo’s account.  
However, the Court was not drawing a distinction between the two condi-
tions.  Rather, it was equating them.  Evidence derived from the “testimoni-
al content of what was said” is necessarily evidence that is also “related to 
some communicative act.”  In this case, the communicative act is speaking.  
In other words, the qualifier “testimonial” necessarily implies some sort of 
act on the part of an individual. 
Specifically, in Estelle, the Court ruled that admission of the psychia-
trist’s testimony into evidence violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege on grounds that: 
Dr. Grigson’s diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not 
based simply on his observation of respondent.  Rather, Dr. 
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Grigson drew his conclusions largely from respondent’s account 
of the crime during their interview, and he placed particular em-
phasis on what he considered to be respondent’s lack of remorse.  
Dr. Grigson’s prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on 
statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting 
the details of the crime.  The Fifth Amendment privilege, there-
fore, is directly involved here because the State used as evidence 
against respondent the substance of his disclosures during the pre-
trial psychiatric examination.64 
The necessary link between testimonial content and communicative 
action is further enforced by subsequent cases.  Nine years after Estelle, in 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz,65 the Court was asked to decide which, if any, of a 
defendant’s incriminating utterances and actions were testimonial.66  The 
case concerned an individual, Muniz, who was pulled over for suspected 
drunk driving and was asked to perform three field sobriety tests.  Muniz 
performed these tests poorly and made incriminating remarks during the 
process.67  He was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and 
taken to the police station for booking.  The defendant was not apprised of 
his Miranda rights during the arrest or at the booking station.  However, he 
was informed that he would be videotaped and audio-recorded. 
Police asked the defendant a number of identifying questions, such as 
his name, address, height, and age.  Although he answered all of the ques-
tions, he stumbled over his address and age.  The questioning officer then 
asked the defendant “Do you know what the date was of your sixth birth-
day?”  After the defendant gave an inaudible answer, the officer again 
asked, “When you turned six years old, do you remember what the date 
was?”  The defendant responded that he did not know.68 
As the Court explained, “Muniz’s answer to the sixth birthday ques-
tion was incriminating, not just because of his delivery, but also because of 
his answer’s content; the trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (i.e., 
that he did not know the proper date) that his mental state was confused.”69  
While the State argued that the inference only concerned the physiological 
functioning of the defendant’s brain, which is as much “real” or “physical” 
evidence as blood, the Court held that the State’s interpretation of the infer-
ence “addresses the wrong question; that the ‘fact’ to be inferred might be 
said to concern the physical status of Muniz’s brain merely describes the 
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way in which the inference is incriminating.”70  Instead, the Court deter-
mined that the right question to be asking in this case “is whether the in-
criminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act 
or from physical evidence.”71 
The Court’s phrase “testimonial act” clearly indicates that, for Fifth 
Amendment purposes, only actions can be testimonial.  While an act on the 
part of the individual asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege may be a 
necessary component of testimony, it is not sufficient.  Relying upon Doe v. 
United States,72 the Court maintained that “[u]nless some attempt is made 
to secure a communication—written, oral or otherwise—upon which reli-
ance is to be placed as involving [the accused’s] consciousness of the facts 
and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him 
is not a testimonial one.”73  In other words, “in order to be testimonial, an 
accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factu-
al assertion or disclose information.”74 
From Muniz, it is clear that the Court has a two-prong standard for de-
termining when evidence is testimonial.  First, the evidence must be re-
vealed through an act, which might be verbal, written, or physical (e.g., a 
head nod), on the part of the individual asserting the privilege.  Second, the 
act must be communicative, meaning it must relate a factual assertion or 
disclose information. 
There is a line of cases, known as the Act of Production Cases, that 
further demonstrate that the Court considers the type of act taken by the de-
fendant to be the defining feature of testimony.  In Fisher v. United States,75 
the Court addressed the question of whether compelling the production of 
tax documents that had been prepared by taxpayers’ accountants and trans-
ferred to the taxpayers’ attorneys violated the taxpayers’ Fifth Amendment 
privilege.76  The Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege could not 
be invoked.77  The Justices reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only pro-
tects an individual from being compelled to be a witness against himself 
and that the taxpayers “retained any privilege they ever had not to be com-
pelled to testify against themselves and not to be compelled themselves to 
produce private papers in their possession.”78 
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The Fisher Court distinguished between the contents of the documents 
in question and the act of producing those documents.  Quoting Johnson v. 
United States, the Court explained, “[a] party is privileged from producing 
evidence but not from its production.”79  With respect to the contents of the 
documents, the Court acknowledged that while a subpoena requiring a tax-
payer to produce an accountant’s documents certainly involves compulsion, 
“it does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the tax-
payer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents 
sought.”80  However, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he act of producing 
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects 
of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced” because 
“[c]ompliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the pa-
pers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer” and would 
further “indicate the taxpayer’s belief that the papers are those described in 
the subpoena.”81  Nevertheless, the Fisher Court held that the taxpayers 
could not invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege on the grounds that: 
It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and posses-
sion of the papers rises to the level of testimony within the pro-
tection of the Fifth Amendment.  The papers belong to the ac-
countant, were prepared by him, and are the kind usually prepared 
by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client.  Surely 
the Government is in no way relying on the “truthtelling” of the 
taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents.  
The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclu-
sion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the 
papers.82 
A few months after Fisher, the Court decided Andresen v. Maryland.83  
The central question addressed in this case was whether a person’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege is violated by the introduction into evidence of busi-
ness records seized during a search of his offices.84  As in Fisher, the Court 
emphasized the minimal role of the accused in furnishing and authenticat-
ing the documents desired by the State.  The government’s search for, sei-
zure of, and admission of the documents into evidence did not violate peti-
tioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege.85  Echoing Fisher, the Court reasoned 
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that the evidence was not testimonial because the “petitioner was not asked 
to say or to do anything.”86  As the Court explained: 
The records seized contained statements that petitioner had volun-
tarily committed to writing.  The search for and seizure of these 
records were conducted by law enforcement personnel.  Finally, 
when these records were introduced at trial, they were authenti-
cated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner.  Any compulsion 
of petitioner to speak, other than the inherent psychological pres-
sure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present.87 
Doe v. United States88 similarly held that only communicative acts can 
be testimonial.89  In Doe, the question before the Court was whether a peti-
tioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege is violated by a court order compelling 
the petitioner to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his ac-
counts.90  Notably, authorization did not require the petitioner to identify or 
acknowledge the existence of these accounts. 
The petitioner, named as John Doe, was the target of a federal grand 
jury investigation concerning suspected fraudulent manipulation of oil car-
goes and receipt of unreported income.  Doe appeared before a grand jury 
regarding a subpoena that directed him to produce records of transactions in 
accounts at three named banks in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda.  Doe 
produced some of the bank records and testified that he did not possess or 
control additional records responsive to the subpoena.  When questioned 
about the existence or location of additional records, Doe invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  The Court held that the 
petitioner could be compelled to sign the consent directive authorizing for-
eign banks to disclose his records because it “is not testimonial in nature.”91  
The Court explained that “in order to be testimonial, an accused’s commu-
nication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or dis-
close information.”92  The Court concluded that signing a consent directive 
does not have testimonial significance because “neither the form, nor its ex-
ecution, communicates any factual assertions, implicit or explicit, or con-
veys any information to the Government.”93 
There is a common theme running through the Act of Production Cas-
es: an individual cannot assert his Fifth Amendment privilege unless the 
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production of incriminating documents involves an act on the part of the 
accused that either (1) relates a factual assertion or (2) discloses information 
about the suspect’s knowledge of the documents.  The following two cases 
further illuminate the importance of these two factors in the Court’s analy-
sis.  They provide examples of times the Court did rule that an act of pro-
ducing documents, but not the content of the documents, had testimonial 
significance. 
In United States v. Doe (not to be confused with the case Doe v. Unit-
ed States discussed earlier), the Court was asked to rule on whether the 
compelled production of business documents owned by, and in the posses-
sion of, the respondent was a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege.94  The Court held that, although the contents of the subpoenaed 
documents were not privileged under the Fifth Amendment, the act of pro-
ducing the documents was testimonial in nature and was therefore within 
the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.95  The Court’s reasoning was 
that “the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-
incrimination.”96 
More recently, in United States v. Hubbell,97 the Court considered 
whether compelling the defendant, Hubbell, to disclose the existence of in-
criminating documents violated his Fifth Amendment privilege when the 
government was unable to demonstrate with “reasonable particularity” a 
prior awareness either that the documents requested in the subpoena existed 
or that they were in the defendant’s possession.98  Echoing its ruling in 
Fisher, the Court maintained that the element of compelled testimony “is 
not to be found in the contents of the documents produced in response to 
the subpoena.”99  However, unlike in Fisher, the Court here determined that 
“the act of producing those documents” was testimonial.100  The Justices 
emphasized the prosecutor’s reliance on the “respondent’s assistance both 
to identify potential sources of information and to produce those 
sources.”101 
In Fisher, the government “already knew that the documents were in 
the attorneys’ possession and could independently confirm their existence 
and authenticity through the accountants who created them.”102  By con-
trast, in Hubbell, the government was not able to demonstrate “that it had 
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any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 
13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by respondent.”103  Addi-
tionally, the Court emphasized the substantial mental effort that the gov-
ernment forced the defendant to undertake.  According to the Court, forcing 
the defendant to produce the subpoenaed documents was equivalent to forc-
ing him to answer a series of detailed interrogatories about those docu-
ments.104  For this reason, the Court concluded that the defendant’s act of 
production was testimonial and, therefore, constitutionally protected.105 
Hubbell caps off a long line of cases that show that testimonial content can-
not exist without a communicative act.  This requirement precludes the 
third and final possibility regarding neuro lie detection’s place within the 
physical-testimonial dichotomy. 
Like the hybrid option, which treats some types of neuro evidence as 
physical and other types as testimonial, and the physical option, which 
treats all forms of neuro evidence as physical, treating all types of neuro ev-
idence as testimonial also fails.  Because not all neuro lie detection tests re-
quire a communicative act on the part of the defendant, classifying all of 
them as testimonial would be inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine.  
Given the Court’s current jurisprudence, neuro lie detection remains unclas-
sifiable.  At present, the physical-testimonial division simply cannot ac-
commodate neuro lie detection technologies. 
Although the Fifth Amendment debate is currently at an impasse, the 
broader question of whether it is constitutional for the government to com-
pel a person to submit to a neuro lie detection test does have an answer.  In 
Part III, we make progress on this issue by shifting the focus to the Fourth 
Amendment.  Specifically, we argue that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
the compelled use of neuro lie detection because it unconstitutionally vio-
lates a person’s mental privacy and the associated right to human dignity. 
III.  MENTAL PRIVACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
Imagine the following scenario: The defense calls a key eyewitness to 
the stand.  During questioning, the witness testifies that the criminal looked 
nothing like the defendant and, therefore, the defendant could not possibly 
                                                          
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 41–42 (holding that asking the defendant to produce the subpoenaed documents 
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have committed the crime.  The prosecutor cross-examines the witness but 
is unable to poke holes in her testimony.  After concluding the cross exami-
nation, the prosecutor moves to compel the witness to take a neuro lie de-
tection test in order to check the truthfulness of her responses.  Can the wit-
ness assert a constitutional privilege to avoid being forced to submit to the 
neuro lie detection test? 
Unlike criminal defendants, witnesses generally cannot object on Fifth 
Amendment grounds.106  Therefore, if they are to avoid being compelled to 
undergo neuro lie detection tests, they must rely on another constitutional 
provision for protection.  Fortunately, for them, there is a very clear reason 
that neuro lie detection tests are constitutionally inadmissible, and the rea-
son has nothing to do with the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-
incrimination.  Rather, it goes to one of the most fundamental constitutional 
rights: the guarantee of mental privacy and human dignity enshrined in the 
Fourth Amendment.107 
Our argument advances the debate surrounding the constitutionality of 
neuro lie detection tests in two key ways.  First, it expands the scope of the 
discussion beyond criminal defendants.  Specifically, we focus on witness-
es, a group that has previously not been examined in the context of neuro lie 
detection.  This lack of discussion is very peculiar insofar as witnesses play 
a crucial role in helping judges and jurors uncover the truth.  Second, we 
sidestep the physical-testimonial question that has divided scholars.108  If 
the constitutional guarantee of human dignity acts as a shield against com-
pelled neuro lie detection tests for witnesses, then it must also protect crim-
inal defendants who, by virtue of their humanity, also have the right of hu-
                                                          
 106.  In the hypothetical, even if that particular witness were involved in the crime and other-
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man dignity.  By appealing to human dignity, we eliminate the need to cat-
egorize neuro evidence as either physical or testimonial. 
The phrase “human dignity” appears nowhere in the Constitution.  
Nonetheless, its influence is felt throughout the entire document.109  From 
the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee to the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and even to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has held that human 
dignity is a fundamental value that underlies many of the Constitution’s 
most important protections:110 
[The concept of human dignity] supposes that there are ways of 
treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full 
member of the human community, and holds that such treatment 
is profoundly unjust. 
 . . . . 
 It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against 
the Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right 
is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing as equally enti-
tled to concern and respect, or some other personal value of like 
consequence.  It does not make sense otherwise.111 
Perhaps nowhere is the manifestation of human dignity more central 
than in the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.112  Interestingly, Schmerber is one of the key Supreme Court 
cases on the matter.  It turns out that scholars were focusing on the right 
case.  They were simply looking at the wrong part of the opinion.  The key 
to resolving the constitutional questions about neuro lie detection is found 
not in Schmerber’s Fifth Amendment discussion, but rather, in its Fourth 
Amendment analysis.113 
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After concluding that the defendant could not object on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds to having his blood drawn, the Schmerber Court took up the 
question of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited such governmental 
action.  The Court began by noting that the Fourth Amendment acts as a 
complement to the Self-Incrimination Clause.114  Even if the evidence is 
deemed admissible under the Fifth Amendment, the Constitution requires 
the Court to take the additional step of determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment nonetheless forbids the gathering of such evidence.115 
To start its analysis, the Court observed that “[t]he overriding function 
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”116  Although all Fourth Amendment 
cases implicate these values, this is especially true when the search occurs 
inside a person’s body.  As the Court wrote, doctrine involving the search 
of a person’s exterior has “little applicability with respect to searches in-
volving intrusions beyond the body’s surface.  The interests in human dig-
nity and privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment forbid any such intru-
sions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”117 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that extracting a person’s blood to de-
termine his blood-alcohol level does not violate his human dignity.  The 
Court reached this decision on the basis that society does not view blood 
tests as an undue imposition upon a person’s privacy and bodily interests.118 
Despite this finding, Schmerber reinforced the idea that human dignity 
concerns weigh heavily in the Fourth Amendment.  As the Court conclud-
ed: 
It bears repeating . . . that we reach this judgment only on the 
facts of the present record.  The integrity of an individual’s per-
son is a cherished value of our society.  That we today hold that 
the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into 
an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no 
way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intru-
sions under other conditions.119 
In Winston v. Lee,120 the Court again took up this issue.121  This time, 
the question was whether the State could force a criminal defendant to un-
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dergo surgery to remove a bullet from his collarbone.122  The Justices reaf-
firmed Schmerber by holding that certain types of intrusions into a person’s 
body are prohibited even though they may produce evidentiary benefits.123  
In Winston, however, the Court went one step further and helped clarify 
what types of intrusions are forbidden.  Specifically, the Court found that 
intrusions which severely violate one’s “dignitary interests in personal pri-
vacy and bodily integrity” are unconstitutional.124  Following this reason-
ing, the Court held that compelling the defendant to submit to the surgery is 
an unconstitutional intrusion on his privacy interests.125 
Importantly, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit all activities that invade a person’s privacy.  Instead, there are two 
competing interests that must be weighed against each other.126  On the one 
side lie the individual’s dignity interests.  On the other side lies society’s 
interest in accurately determining an individual’s guilt or innocence. 
The Court emphasized that the potential bodily harm to the individual 
was not the primary basis for the decision.127  Rather, the more fundamental 
harm was the fact that compelled surgery would usurp the individual’s own 
will and substitute it with the will of the State.128  Relying upon this balanc-
ing test, the Court determined that the evidence that could be gathered from 
the defendant’s surgery did not outweigh the substantial harm to the de-
fendant’s human dignity.129  Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment barred 
the State from compelling the defendant to undergo the surgery. 
In other situations, where the intrusion is minor, the State’s interests 
can outweigh the defendant’s dignity interests.  For example, in Maryland 
v. King,130 the Court ruled that Maryland could swab a suspect’s mouth up-
on arrest in order to gather a DNA sample that would be used to identify the 
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suspect.131  The Court emphasized that such a procedure both fails to offend 
a person’s dignity in a meaningful way132 and facilitates an important police 
interest—namely, determining the identity of the suspect.133 
Likewise, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,134 the 
Court held that the Federal Railroad Administration could constitutionally 
require breath, blood, and urine drug tests for railroad employees.135  A ma-
jority of the Court found that the government’s interest in promoting public 
safety outweighed the privacy intrusions of these drug tests.136 
Not all of the Justices agreed, however.  In a dissent, Justices Marshall 
and Brennan invoked Schmerber to support their view that “[c]ompelling a 
person to submit to the piercing of his skin by a hypodermic needle so that 
his blood may be extracted significantly intrudes on the ‘personal privacy 
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State’ against which the 
Fourth Amendment protects.”137  Of note here is that the point of contention 
between the majority and the dissent was the degree to which a person’s 
dignity is harmed by compulsory drug testing.  Whereas the majority af-
firmed the regulation because they believed the harm to be slight, the dis-
sent would have voided the regulation on the grounds that the intrusion was 
substantial. 
As these cases show, the Fourth Amendment’s protective power shifts 
according to the extent of the human dignity violation.  When the violation 
is substantial, the Fourth Amendment concern is strong and the search is 
almost certain to be ruled unconstitutional.  But when the violation is mini-
mal, the Fourth Amendment concern is weak and the search is almost cer-
tain to be upheld.138 
We maintain that compelled neuro lie detection is a substantial dignity 
violation that triggers Fourth Amendment protection.  On a purely physical 
level, neuro lie detection is admittedly less invasive than drawing a person’s 
blood.  In both fMRI and EEG lie detection, no physical device intrudes be-
yond the body’s surface.  Privacy, however, extends beyond the physical 
into the mental realm.139 
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As the Court observed in Winston v. Lee, intrusions that do no harm to 
the individual’s physical person may nonetheless “damage the individual’s 
sense of personal privacy and security” and will, therefore, trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection.140  Just as searching a person’s house with a ther-
mal-imaging device or eavesdropping upon a person’s phone conversations 
undermines that individual’s privacy interests without invading his bodily 
space,141 so, too, does neuro lie detection infringe upon a person’s right to 
privacy in a non-physical manner.142 
In neuro lie detection, a person’s human dignity is violated because her 
thoughts and memories are forcibly extracted from her mind.  If there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy anywhere, then there is surely a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of one’s mind.  In-
deed, no place is more private.  Forcing an individual to open this domain 
to others constitutes a much more fundamental privacy violation than any 
the Court has yet encountered.  If we permit the State to intrude upon our 
thoughts, no domain will be safe from government surveillance. 
In any reasonable balancing test, the weight must go in support of pre-
serving mental privacy.  Certainly, the government has a substantial interest 
in accurately determining guilt or innocence, but individuals have a much 
stronger interest in preserving a private mental sphere, free from govern-
mental intervention.  In the Kantian sense, this invasion of mental privacy 
violates a person’s respect and status as a human being by treating him as a 
mere object to be used to further the State’s ends.  Specifically, the State is 
subverting the will of the individual in order to further its own interests.  
This subversion of will is the very action that was deemed unconstitutional 
in Winston.143 
As with any constitutional protection, there are tradeoffs.  If neuro lie 
detection is prohibited, judges and jurors will have less information on 
which to base their findings and conclusions.  However, to permit otherwise 
would be to license the government to invade our mental sphere—the place 
where we have the highest possible expectation of privacy.  This is a con-
cession not worth making.  The guarantee of human dignity is simply too 
fundamental to cast aside.144 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The science behind neuro lie detection is rapidly advancing.  Although 
it is not yet reliable enough for use in the courtroom, that day is not far off.  
When that time comes, courts will need to determine whether neuro lie de-
tection evidence is constitutionally admissible.  To date, the legal scholar-
ship has focused on whether forcing a criminal defendant to undergo a neu-
ro lie detection test would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.  We argue that there are two key problems with this 
analysis. 
First, the Supreme Court case law does not provide a clear answer to 
the question.  The current understanding of the physical-testimonial divide 
is simply incapable of accommodating neuro lie detection.  Second, even if 
the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment does protect against compelled 
neuro lie detection, the protection would only apply to criminal defendants.  
It would not prevent witnesses, jurors, or any other individuals from being 
forced to submit to neuro lie detection tests.  This is problematic because a 
compelled neuro lie detection test constitutes a substantial privacy violation 
to all citizens, not just criminal defendants. 
In this Paper, we stepped back from the Fifth Amendment discourse 
and offered an alternative constitutional basis for prohibiting neuro lie de-
tection tests—specifically, the constitutional guarantee of human dignity as 
manifested in the Fourth Amendment right to privacy.  Our argument solves 
both of the problems endemic to the Fifth Amendment dispute.  Specifical-
ly, our theory has strong precedential support in Supreme Court case law, 
and it is universally applicable to all persons, not just criminal defendants. 
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